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Life during (and after) Wartime: Enforceability of
Waivers under USERRA
David Oglest

INTRODUCTION

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994' (USERRA) guarantees returning members of
the military reinstatement to the same jobs they enjoyed before
service interrupted their private lives. This includes the benefits, pay,
and seniority they would be entitled to if the interruption had not
occurred
When George Wysocki returned to the United States in 2008
after serving a tour of duty in Afghanistan, he understandably
expected to regain his position at the computing firm IBM. The
company, however, was displeased with what it considered a
deterioration in Wysocki's skills and decided to terminate him after
only a few months. IBM offered Wysocki a severance package worth
a shade over $6,000 on the condition that he release his USERRA
discrimination claims against the company? He signed the agreement
but sued IBM anyway, alleging that his USERRA rights had been
violated. Wysocki's suit relied on a provision in USERRA that
renders private agreements reducing reemployment rights
unenforceable unless the provisions of the private agreement are
"more beneficial" for the veteran than those provided by the Act.'
The Sixth Circuit found that the severance agreement was
"more beneficial" under the meaning of this provision, 38 USC
§ 4302, than Wysocki's USERRA rights. It was sufficient, the court
held, that the agreement was supported by consideration and
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accordingly that Wysocki believed at the time that the rights in the
agreement were "more beneficial." The court then enforced the
release because Wysocki could provide no evidence of duress,
mistake, or other unfair dealing.' Wysocki was entitled to his $6,000
but not his job at IBM.
Wysocki's story is similar to that of many veterans returning
from Afghanistan and Iraq. Though Congress enacted USERRA to

secure civilian work for returning veterans, it did not anticipate that
the number of activated military reservists would swell to 793,447
soldiers over the span of a decade. The strain on private employers

in the economic downturn has encouraged some to resort to tactics
similar to IBM's; the Pentagon has reported that over 10 percent of
returning servicemembers face difficulties returning to work and
asserting their rights under USERRA.7
Even given this strain, the result in Wysocki seems intuitively
wrong. It is difficult to see how $6,000 is "more beneficial" than eight
months' salary at any job, let alone one at IBM. But because the
Wysocki decision was the first by the federal appellate courts to
interpret the meaning of "more beneficial,"8 Wysocki's holding-that

any contract supported by consideration is per se "more beneficial"
to veterans-is the first step in establishing a precedent that could
become settled federal law. Employers might thereafter be able to

extract unfair, ultimately harmful releases and waivers from
veterans, contrary to the spirit of USERRA's sweeping protection.
On the other hand, competing interpretations of "more beneficial"
effectively eliminate the possibility for any waiver or release,
perhaps chilling opportunities for mutually advantageous severance
deals.
Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1108.
See Department of Defense, Reserve Components: Noble Eagle / Enduring Freedom /
New Dawn *1 (Dec 21, 2010), online at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20101221ngr.pdf (visited
Nov 2, 2011).
7 Lesley Stahl, Reservists' Rocky Return to Job Market *1 (CBS News, Feb 11, 2009),
(visited
online at http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2008/10/30/60minutes/main4558315.shtml
Nov 2, 2011).
There is reason to think that such occurrences between employers and returning
servicemembers will rise in the near future, as troops return home due to recent withdrawals
from Iraq and Europe. See Joseph Logan, Last Troops Leave U.S., Ending War, Reuters (Dec
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18/us-iraq-withdrawalonline
at
18,
2011),
idUSTRE7BHO3320111218 (visited Feb 7, 2012); Elisabeth Bumiller and Steven Erlanger,
Panetta and Clinton Seek to Reassure Europe on Defense, NY Times (Feb 4, 2012), online at
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/europe/panetta-clinton-troops-europe.html
Feb 7, 2012).
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Much, then, hinges on the meaning of "more beneficial" in
38 USC § 4302 and when this section applies. One interpretative
difficulty is whether "more beneficial" applies only when agreements
augment USERRA benefits, or if it still applies when agreements
reduce these benefits but are nonetheless net beneficial to the
veteran. If the latter, courts face yet another difficult choice: Should
they determine whether an agreement is "more beneficial" than
USERRA based on objective valuations or the subjective beliefs of
the parties at the time of contract formation? Further, is it true that
§ 4302 is the only source of law that limits the enforceability of
private agreements reducing USERRA benefits?
This Comment answers these questions, offering an interpretation
of "more beneficial" that accords with both the text and spirit of
USERRA. Part I discusses the background of "more beneficial" in
§ 4302, USERRA's relation-to-other-laws provision. It further shows
that existing rules cannot be reconciled. The Sixth Circuit's Wysocki
rule, in practice, makes nearly any waiver "more beneficial," while
other lower court rulings and Department of Labor (DOL)
regulations disallow waivers entirely. Part I also delves into
USERRA's legislative history, which suggests Congress intended to
retain common law protections that would further limit, but not
eliminate, USERRA waivers.
Part II exposes flaws in existing interpretations of USERRA's
"more beneficial" provision. Part III advocates an intermediate
position not yet proposed by any court or commentator: that "more
beneficial" in § 4302 allows only retrospective, individually
bargained-for waivers that make the veteran objectively better off.
This Comment argues that this rule is the only one consistent with
Congress's express intent in drafting the provision, established
canons of statutory construction, and the interpretation of similar
provisions in other areas of law.
I. TENTATIVE DECISIONS: CASES, REGULATIONS, AND REPORTS
ON THE RELATION OF USERRA TO OTHER LAWS

A. Predecessors and Purposes of USERRA
The United States has offered veterans some form of federal
reemployment rights since 1940 under the Selective Training and
Service Act.' Coverage remained roughly the same until Congress

9 See Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 § 8, Pub L No 76-783, 54 Stat 885, 890
(guaranteeing reemployment rights for federal employees).
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dramatically expanded benefits in 1974 with the Veterans'
Reemployment Rights Act' (VRRA). The VRRA allowed a veteran
to ask for a leave of absence from her private employer to go on
active duty and guaranteed her the same position upon return, with
the same "seniority, status, pay, and vacation" as if she "had not
been absent for such purposes."" Though Congress believed the
VRRA "effectively served the interests of veterans, members of the
Reserve Components, the Armed Forces and employers," it was

concerned

that the

statute

was

"complex

and

sometimes

ambiguous[,]... allowing for misinterpretations."' 2 Congress began

drafting USERRA to reform these protections to "clarify, simplify,
and where necessary, strengthen the existing veterans' employment
and reemployment rights."' 3 However, USERRA's drafters stressed
that "the extensive body of [VRRA] case law that has evolved.., to

the extent that it is consistent with the provisions of [the proposed
USERRA legislation], remains in full force and effect in interpreting
[USERRA's] provisions.""
Congress finally enacted USERRA in 1994 "to encourage

noncareer service in the uniformed services by... minimizing the
disadvantages to civilian careers and employment,"" as well as others

in servicemembers' "communities, by providing for the prompt
reemployment of" servicemembers" "to prohibit discrimination."'7
The statute accomplishes these goals by offering three types of

protection. It prohibits discrimination and retaliation against
prospective and returning servicemembers, preserves employee
benefits while they fulfill their

duties,

reemployment and retraining upon their

and mandates

return. 8

their

To facilitate this

10 Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-508, 88 Stat 1578, codified
as amended at 38 USC §§ 2021-27 (1992) (intending "to increase vocational rehabilitation
subsistence allowances ... paid to eligible veterans" and "to promote the employment of
veterans ... [by] codify[ing] and expand[ing] veterans reemployment rights").
11 Woodman v Office of Personnel Management, 258 F3d 1372, 1376 (Fed Cir 2001),
quoting 38 USC § 2024(d) (West 1988).
12 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1993, HR Rep
No 103-65, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 18, reprinted in 1994 USCCAN 2449-92, 2451.
13 Id.
14 Id at 19.
15 USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4301(a)(1).
16 USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4301(a)(2).
17 USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4301(a)(3).
18 See Aloysius F. Rohmeyer and Bruce D. Schrimpf, Employment Law and How the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act Protects Servicemembers,
43 Clearinghouse Rev: J Poverty L & Pol 282, 286 (2009).
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protective role, courts "construe USERRA's provisions liberally, in

favor of the service member."'"
Unfortunately, USERRA has not proven immune to conflicting
interpretations. USERRA includes a murky relation-to-other-laws

provision, which has been difficult for courts to apply.'
Section 4302(a), referred to henceforth as the "more beneficial"
provision, provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall supersede, nullify or diminish any
Federal or State law (including any local law or ordinance),

contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that
establishes a right or benefit that is more beneficial to, or is in
addition to, a right or benefit provided for such person in this

chapter.
Section 4302(b), or the "reduces" provision, however,
supersedes any State law (including any local law or ordinance),

contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that
reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit
provided by this chapter, including the establishment

of

additional prerequisites to the exercise of any such right or the
receipt of any such benefit.
Thus, § 4302(a) (that is, the "more beneficial" provision)
appears to permit agreements and laws that make veterans better
off, while § 4302(b) (that is, the "reduces" provision) prohibits

agreements that make veterans worse off. What is not clear is how to
apply these commands to agreements or laws that make veterans

better off in some ways and worse off in others. In other words, the
statute does not speak clearly to situations where contracts or laws
are on net "more beneficial" than USERRA benefits.'
19 Gordon v Wawa, Inc, 388 F3d 78, 81 (3d Cir 2004).
20 The VRRA did not explicitly address how it related to private agreements, plans, or
policies. It did, however, provide that "[t]he rights granted by [VRRA] to persons who left the
employ of a State ... and were inducted into the Armed Forces shall not diminish any rights
such persons may have pursuant to any statute or ordinance of such State or political
subdivision establishing greater or additional rights or protections." VRRA § 404(a), 88 Stat
at 1596. The sweep of this provision is clearly far more limited than USERRA's-it applies
only to former state and city government employees, does not mention private agreements,
and does not separate benefits from reductions as does the current 38 USC § 4302. Most
importantly for our purposes, it did not include the "more beneficial" language interpreted
here. This at least suggests that Congress may have intended a different relation to other laws
and agreements in USERRA than was created by the "greater or additional rights" not
superseded by the VRRA.
21 Though "net beneficial" technically describes both situations, this Comment refers to
agreements that increase rights in some ways but reduces them in others as "net beneficial

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:387

Courts and agencies have reached conflicting decisions as to
whether "more beneficial" permits net beneficial agreements.'
Part I.B discusses state and federal district court decisions holding
that § 4302 prohibits net beneficial bargains. It further discusses
Department of Labor (DOL) regulations interpreting "more
beneficial" and concludes that DOL also prohibits net beneficial
agreements. Part I.C analyzes in depth the meaning of the Wysocki
decision and its accompanying concurrence, which both depart from
DOL's approach. Finally, Part I.D explores the legislative history
found both in House committee and Senate reports, suggesting
additional considerations the institutions yet to interpret "more
beneficial" might unduly ignore.
B.

Initial Interpretations and Agency Regulations

In the initial case to address the meaning of § 4302, Perez v
Uline, Inc,23 a California appellate court refused to enforce a
severance agreement paying the veteran plaintiff six weeks of his
salary in exchange for a release operating as a "waiver of all
claims."'2 It held that § 4302 "plainly states that a contract may not
limit the protections of USERRA" and refused to sustain the
employer's "assertion that the agreement waived the protections" it
affords.' The court did not consider the impact this interpretation
would have on the "more beneficial" provision, nor did it consider
the legislative history of the bill in coming to its conclusion.' Later
courts came to the same conclusion as Perez, either expressly or by
implication. 7 One court has referred to "reduces" as "an antiwaiver
provision. ' Another, in invalidating an employer plan, noted that
"Congress intended a uniform set of protections available to
returning veterans in the several states and expressly forbade
modification of these protections by... contractual bargaining
because it would frustrate the statutory purpose. '"' However, none of
agreements," as opposed to agreements that augment rights without reducing them in other
areas.
22
Compare Wysocki v InternationalBusiness Machines Corp, 607 F3d 1102, 1108 (6th
Cir 2010), with 20 CFR § 1002.7.
2
68 Cal Rptr 3d 872 (Cal App 2007).
24
See id at 875.
25 Id.
26
Id.
27
For an example of a case that considers USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4302(a)-(b), but
ignores this relational interpretative problem, see Carderv ContinentalAirlines, Inc, 2009 WL
4342477, *7 (SD Tex).
Kitts v Menards, Inc, 519 F Supp 2d 837, 840 (ND Ind 2007).
2
29
Wriggelsworth v Brumbaugh, 129 F Supp 2d 1106, 1112 (WD Mich 2001).
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these rulings considered the possibility, as proposed by the later
ruling in Wysocki, that § 4302(a) limits § 4302(b)?'
The Department of Labor's interpretation of USERRA echoes

the interpretation of these lower courts. It promulgated rules in 2005
interpreting "more beneficial" to mean that "USERRA establishes a
floor, not a ceiling" for employment and reemployment rights.' In
other words, "[i]f an employer provides a benefit that exceeds
USERRA's requirements in one area, it cannot reduce or limit other
rights or benefits provided by USERRA." 2 DOL also reversed the

order of the provisions as presented in the statute, including
§ 4302(b) in its entirety at 27 CFR § 1002.7(b) and § 4302(a) at
27 CFR § 1002.7(c). The regulations go on to illustrate the

consequences of this interpretation:
For example, even though USERRA does not require it, an

employer may provide a fixed number of days of paid military
leave per year to employees who are members of the National
Guard or Reserve. The fact that it provides such a benefit,

however, does not permit an employer to refuse to provide an
unpaid leave of absence to an employee to perform service in
the uniformed services in excess of the number of days of paid
military leave.3
Note that DOL does not suggest that it is relevant whether the
veterans' gains from more paid days of leave outweigh their losses
from fewer unpaid days-the fact an additional benefit was provided
cannot permit an employer to limit a USERRA right. Thus,
according to DOL, § 4302 allows agreements to augment benefits but
prohibits trading away rights for a net beneficial bargain?' DOL's

"floor" does not make explicit exceptions for waivers or releases of
See Part I.C.1.
20 CFR § 1002.7(a).
32
20 CFR § 1002.7(d).
33
20 CFR § 1002.7(d).
34 Oddly, courts interpreting § 4302 have so far ignored DOL's interpretation. See, for
example, Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1102, 1107-08; id at 1110 (Martin concurring). Accordingly, they
have also ignored the possibility that this interpretation is entitled to deference. See National
Association of Home Builders v Defenders of Wildlife, 551 US 644, 665 (2007) (stating the rule
that courts defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute "only where Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue through the statutory text"); Carderv
Continental Airlines, Inc, 636 F3d 172, 181 (5th Cir 2011). But deference is not a foregone
conclusion, because the regulations do not specifically address full releases of USERRA
rights-they do so only by deductive reasoning. See Middleton v City of Chicago, 578 F3d 655,
661 (7th Cir 2009). Whether these regulations are entitled to deference is not, however,
relevant to this Comment, because it seeks to establish the correct interpretation of § 4302, for
both courts and DOL. See text accompanying notes 35-36.
30

31
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USERRA claims. The natural consequence of this hard limit is that
veterans may not bargain for outcomes that clearly make them
better off. Providing benefits in addition to those granted by the
statute does not permit reducing those it guarantees. Just as a fixed
number of days of paid military leave is an additional benefit that
could not justify an employer limiting unpaid leave, a cash settlement
is an additional benefit that could not excuse an agreement to waive
all other USERRA rights.
While perhaps it is not surprising that DOL interprets this
provision as broadly as possible in favor of veterans (at least
superficially), there is good reason to think that the agency did not
consider the effect of this interpretation on waivers. In the Federal
Register, the agency responded during the notice-and-comment
period to many of its proposed regulations related to USERRA."
Yet this document merely reproduces the regulations promulgated
to interpret § 4302 as applied to service members after their return
without mentioning any concerns or counterarguments to its
position-it merely proffers it without explanation." This suggests
that no serious attempt was made to challenge the agency's
interpretation. It's quite possible that DOL did not consider the
impact of its interpretation on waiver and release, and from this it is
not obvious that it examined the legislative history of USERRA to
reach its interpretative conclusion.
C.

Wysocki and Its Lineage

In Wysocki v InternationalBusiness Machines Corp," the Sixth
Circuit departed from the antiwaiver rule.' George Wysocki was a
longtime IBM employee and military reservist." After returning from
his previous tours of duty, IBM had provided him the necessary

35
See Department of Labor, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994, 70 Fed Reg 75245, 75245-75313 (2005) (responding after comment period
on proposed 20 CFR § 1002).
36
70 Fed Reg at 75256-57 (cited in note 35) (discussing three comments contesting the
inability to waive USERRA reemployment rights before or during service and the
department's response that the text and legislative history of § 4302(b) indicate prohibition
against waiver). In DOL's response, the antiwaiver analysis was restricted to situations arising
under § 1002.88 (regarding reemployment waivers) and did not extend to analysis of situations
arising under § 1002.7 (regarding the "floor" in employee benefits after securing
reemployment).
37
607 F3d 1102 (6th Cir 2010).
38
See id at 1108.
39 Brief for George Wysocki in Support of the Petition for Certiorari, George Wysocki v
International Business Machines Corp, No 10-647, *6 (US filed Nov 12, 2010) (available on
Westlaw at 2010 WL 4641647).
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retraining and benefits guaranteed to him under USERRA. ' Upon
his return in July 2007, however, IBM claimed that Wysocki's skills
had unacceptably deteriorated. Rather than granting him
opportunities to shadow and retrain, IBM refused to offer these
services and terminated his employment in October 2007.'
IBM quickly offered Wysocki a severance agreement that would
give him $6,023.65 if he agreed to release all his claims related to his
"veteran status" against IBM. The terms stated that Wysocki had
twenty-one days to consider the offer and seven days to rescind the
agreement after signing, and suggested he talk to an attorney before
making a decision. 2 Wysocki accepted the offer, did not rescind the
contract within the seven-day period, and never returned the
payment to IBM. He brought suit in the Eastern District of
Kentucky under USERRA, claiming IBM discriminated against him
based on his status as a veteran. 3
1. The majority opinion: agreements supported by
consideration are "more beneficial" as a matter of law.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
to grant IBM summary judgment on other grounds." The court held
first that the release implicated Wysocki's substantive rights because
the release would preclude his right to seek redress at all, in any
forum.' The next step, then, was to analyze whether USERRA's
"more beneficial" provision operated to void the severance
agreement.
At the outset, the court declared that "the critical inquiry is
whether the Release is exempted from the operation of § 4302(b) by
§ 4302(a), because the rights it provided to Wysocki were more
beneficial than the rights that he waived."' It held then that the
"application [of § 4302(b)] is limited by § 4302(a)." 7 The court did
not explain why this must be so. It noted the policy toward
interpreting the statute in favor of veterans." It also looked to
legislative history, reasoning that the drafters of the statute intended
to allow veterans "to waive their individual USERRA rights by clear
Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1103.
Id.
Idat 1104.
42
43
Id.
44 Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1108.
45 Id at 1107.
Id.
46
47 Id.
48 Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1107.
40
41
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and unambiguous action," and it cited House and Senate reports in
support of this proposition. " Veterans' ability "to waive their
USERRA rights without unnecessary court interference, if they
believe that the consideration they will receive for waiving those
rights is more beneficial than pursuing their rights through the courts,
is both valuable and beneficial to veterans."" The court concluded
from this premise that the "more beneficial" provision saved the
release.
The court then applied its apparent rule that waivers are
allowed if the veteran believed, at the time the agreement was
finalized, the consideration she received was "more beneficial" than
her USERRA rights. It found that "Wysocki understood that the
Release eliminated his USERRA rights" and "that he signed the
Release because he believed that the rights provided in the Release
were more beneficial than his USERRA rights."' Finally, Wysocki
did not present "any argument or evidence to the contrary," nor did
incapacity,
he show that his consent was the result of "mistake,
52
fraud, misrepresentation, unconscionability, or duress."
Worth noting is the majority's dual use of the word "believe"suggesting that the court contemplated a subjective test to satisfy
§ 4302. This raises the question whether the interference the opinion
cautioned against was judicially or legislatively sanctioned, given that
the statute specifies the "more beneficial" language, not the common
law. Finally, it is important to note that the majority concludes
simply that waivers are "valuable and beneficial to veterans," but
fails to weigh the ability to waive against the competing interests the
statute was intended to protect.
2. The concurring opinion: agreements are "more beneficial" if
the veteran believes they are net beneficial to USERRA
rights
Judge Martin Boyce Jr's concurring opinion agreed with the
result and much of the majority's opinion but differed on the analysis
necessary to determine whether an agreement is "more beneficial."
He argued that the posture of the case made it inappropriate to
make broad statements about the effect of § 4302. Wysocki's
complaint did not mention the release, and he provided no evidence

49
50
51
52

Id at 1108.
Id (emphasis added).
Id.
Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1108.

Enforceability of Waivers under USERRA

2012]

that created "a dispute over whether the Release resulted in a
situation more beneficial than [Wysocki's] USERRA rights.5 3
Martin agreed with the result and gave tentative support for the
majority's reasoning only as he understood it.' He did not "read
section 4302 to affect the law's general preference for enforcing
contractual waivers of rights ... though section 4302 drastically alters

the test for determining the enforceability of a waiver.""5 The text
and legislative history of § 4302 indicated that veterans could waive
their rights "so long as the waiver passes" the beneficiality test. His
description of the "critical inquiry" differed subtly from the majority,
however, asking "whether the waiver of USERRA rights results in a
situation more beneficial to the veteran than if the veteran had
asserted his USERRA rights.""
Martin then further clarified his own position in case the
majority opinion's meaning differed from his presumed meaning. He
first argued that finding that the waiver clearly intended to release
USERRA rights, and that the veteran obtained substantial
consideration, "does not permit the inference that the consideration
was more beneficial to the veteran than his USERRA rights." 7
Rather, the existence of a release only proves that the employer has
met the initial burden of production in asserting the release. The
dispositive fact to Martin was not that the waiver was supported by
consideration, but that Wysocki did not respond with any evidence
that the release was less beneficial than USERRA after IBM
satisfied this burden." Martin suggested that "[a]n affidavit likely
would have sufficed to create a question of fact that would have
required the district court.., to determine what it means for one
thing to be 'more beneficial' than something else." 9
One distinction worth noting between the two opinions is the
language suggesting conceptual differences in the scope of "more
beneficial."' Martin's analysis requires courts to determine whether
53

54
55
56
57
58

59

Id at 1109 (Martin concurring).
Id at 1109-10.
Idat 1110.
Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1110 (Martin concurring).

Id.
Id.

Id.
One very strange similarity between the opinions, on the other hand, is their failure to
address or even mention the relevant DOL regulations discussed in Part I.B. See Wysocki,
607 F3d at 1107-08; id at 1110 (Martin concurring). It is unclear from the opinions if the
regulations were purposefully omitted from the discussion, or whether the court ignored them
because the deference line of argument was not briefed by the parties' counsel. See Brief on
Behalf of Defendant-Appellee International Business Machines Corporation, Wysocki v
60
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a contract at issue "results in a situation more beneficial" than what
USERRA would provide.' They must imagine two worlds-one as if
the waiver is signed, and one as if it is not-and compare. The
majority, by contrast, requires only that veterans "believe that the
consideration they will receive... is more beneficial than pursuing
their rights through the courts."'
Both opinions leave open room for subjective analysis. The
majority's view appears to be purely subjective. It is concerned only
with whether the veteran believed the contract to be "more
beneficial," not with whether it actually was so. The concurrence's
focus is on comparing the hypothetical situations that would occur if
the veteran did or did not sign the waiver. It suggests, however, that
Wysocki would have needed to merely submit an affidavit stating his
belief to avoid summary judgment. 3 Requiring a mere assertion
about a private belief under oath is not an evidentiary hurdle that
meaningfully distinguishes it from a subjective test-though it is one
strongly favoring plaintiffs. '
Moreover, the subjective language applied by the majority
suggests that the concurrence's reading of the majority opinion was
incorrect. Recall that Martin agreed with the majority opinion only
as he understood it. His understanding was that Wysocki lost
because he failed to offer evidence answering the more "beneficial
claim" on summary judgment, not because the existence of
consideration compelled the inference that the contract was "more
beneficial." The subjective language and stated policies underlying
the majority's opinion suggest the opposite reading is more accurate.
This account of the Wysocki interpretation appears to be convincing
to federal courts. In Baldwin v City of Greensboro,' the Middle

District Court of North Carolina cited Wysocki as a potential answer
to the plaintiff's claim that waivers were unenforceable under
International Business Machines Corp, Civil Action No 09-5161, *17 (6th Cir filed Apr 28,
2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 1209409) (interpreting § 1002.7 to apply only to
substantive rights, but arguing waivers were procedural); Reply Brief on Behalf of the
Plaintiff-Appellant George Wysocki, Wysocki v InternationalBusiness Machines Corp, Civil
Action No 09-5161 (6th Cir filed May 12, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 8379166)
(neglecting or failing to discuss § 1002.7). For a discussion considering whether these
regulations are entitled to deference, see note 34.
61 Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1110 (Martin concurring).
62
Id at 1108 (majority).
63
Id at 1110 (Martin concurring).
64 Judge Martin's approach is objective in theory but not in practice. If the veteran can
get to trial merely by asserting his subjective belief in an affidavit, much of the value of the
release is negated for the employer-it will have to bear the full cost of trial litigation in
addition to the transaction costs in securing the release.
65 2010 WL 3211055 (MD NC).
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§ 4302.' In a parenthetical, the court described the Sixth Circuit as
holding "that the language of Section 4302 did not supersede a
settlement agreement because the plaintiff received valuable
consideration for his release of his rights under USERRA."' The
court nonetheless denied summary judgment to the defendant on
another ground: the plaintiff provided evidence of duress.'
Regardless of whether this statement was actually intended as
the holding, the fact that the language of the opinion creates these
interpretative problems is evidence enough that more clarification is
necessary. For the purposes of brevity and clarity, this Comment will
refer to the argument that agreement is "more beneficial" as a
matter of law if it is supported by consideration as the "Wysocki
holding" or "Wysocki interpretation"-with the caveat that it might
be dictum.
D. Legislative History
The legislative history of the bill paints a picture unrecognizable
from the courts' interpretations of § 4302. First, both the House and
the Senate indicated that "more beneficial" allows veterans to retain
ownership over their USERRA rights. The House wished to "stress
that rights under [USERRA] belong to the claimant, and he or she
may waive those rights, either explicitly or impliedly, through
conduct,"'6 while the Senate maintained that USERRA rights
"belong to the employee."' Both also noted that, though waivers
were possible, they must be supported by clear actions. The House
said § 4302 required that waivers be "clear, convincing, specific,
unequivocal, and not under duress."71 The Senate used fewer
adjectives but expressed a similar sentiment, noting that "rights...
can only be waived through unambiguous and voluntary action." 2
These passages are damning for the Perez line of cases and
DOL's interpretation of "more beneficial." Both chambers intended
waivers of USERRA rights to be enforceable in at least some
situations. Moreover, if Congress's idea of "waiver" was an
Id at*5.
Id.
68 Id at*6.
69
HR Rep No 103-65 at 20 (cited in note 12) ("[A]ny waiver must, however, be clear,
convincing, specific, unequivocal, and not under duress. Moreover, only known rights which
are already in existence may be waived.").
70
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1993, S Rep
No 103-158, 103d Cong, 1st Sess 41 (1993).
71 HR Rep No 103-65 at 20 (cited in note 12).
72
S Rep No 103-158 at 41 (cited in note 70).
66

67
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agreement that offered greater benefits in some ways and did not
reduce them in any others, why would it demand clear and
convincing evidence? This would actually serve to make it more
difficult for veterans to assert their rights to additional benefits their
employers might bestow. Instead, this evidentiary standard implies
that Congress also contemplated the enforceability of at least some
waivers that pare back USERRA rights.
On the other end of the spectrum, the House and Senate reports
do explain in part where DOL derived some of the language of its
rules. The Senate report states that the "more beneficial" provision
"restate[s] the policy... [USERRA] is intended to be a floor and
not a ceiling on reemployment rights.'" 3 The House report says that
§ 4302(a) "would reaffirm that, to the extent that a Federal or state
law or employer plan or practice provides greater rights than those
provided under the Committee bill, those greater rights would not be
preempted."
In explaining the "reduces" provision, however, the House
appeared to be concerned more with ensuring that federal law
preempted collective modifications of USERRA rights in state
legislation, collective bargaining, and employer plans than with
prohibiting employers and employees from bargaining over
USERRA rights in individual cases. The House report cited Peel v
Florida Department of Transportation" and Cronin v Police
Department of the City of New York," which both addressed the
relationship between the VRRA and conflicting state laws. Peel
stands for the proposition that veterans' rights statutes are a
legitimate exercise of Congress's war power and are not limited in
their effect by either the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments to the US
Constitution.7 The court in Cronin held that the VRRA preempted a
New York statute that placed a limitation on the period in which
veterans could gain pension credit for their military leave, when the
VRRA contained no such limitation. It further suggested that the
"federal government's interest in the area of veterans' and reservists'
rights 'is pervasive and exhibits a clear intent to preempt conflicting
state legislation."'7 The House report also cites to the Supreme

Id.
HR Rep 65 No 103-65 at 20 (cited in note 12).
75 600 F2d 1070 (5th Cir 1979).
76 675 F Supp 847 (SDNY 1987).
77 Peel, 600 F2d at 1085.
78
Cronin, 675 F Supp at 854.
79
Id, quoting Mazak v FloridaDepartmentofAdministration, 1983 WL 1995, *4 (ND Fla).
73
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Court case Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp," which holds
that employer plans and collective bargaining agreements could not
"cut down" service time adjustments authorized by Congress."
These cases all suggest that the "reduces" provision was
primarily intended to ensure that the statute would have preemptive
force over plans and statutes that interfered with federal guarantees
to groups of veterans en masse, not necessarily to interfere with
individual bargaining where employers seek waivers or releases as
part of a severance package. Accordingly, there is no evidence that
either chamber intended § 4302 to always prohibit veterans from
trading away some of their USERRA rights to their employer in
exchange for more valuable benefits.
Another part of USERRA's legislative history lends support to
the notion that Congress intended to limit, but ultimately preserve,
veterans' ability to individually bargain away their USERRA rights.
Unlike either the Perez or Wysocki lines of cases, the House report
distinguishes between agreements that affect "known rights which
are already in existence" and those that affect rights which have not
yet accrued.' To illustrate, the House report cites Leonard v United
Airlines, Inc," a case arising under the VRRA, the predecessor to
USERRA.' In Leonard, a pilot sued his airline company employer
to recover pension funds that would have accrued while he was
serving in the Air Force from 1948 to 1953." Though he failed to
contribute to the fund while he was activated, Leonard requested
that he be allowed to make up the contributions upon his return. But
United claimed he waived his rights to make these contributions
when-on the condition that he sign a release form-he decided to
withdraw from the plan and take the money in 1948.' Leonard
claimed that participation in the plan was a perquisite of seniority
and sued under the VRRA'
The court found that he made a knowing and intelligent choice
to sign the waiver and withdraw just before being called to duty."
Despite this finding, the court refused to enforce the release
328 US 275 (1946).
See id at 285. The Court nevertheless found that the plaintiff asked for more than was
actually guaranteed to him. Id.
82 HR Rep 103-65 at 20 (cited in note 12).
83 972 F2d 155 (7th Cir 1992).
84 For a discussion of the VRRA and its relation to other law, see notes 10-14, 20, and
accompanying text.
85 Leonard, 972 F2d at 156.
80
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agreement. The court noted, "There is no question that veterans can
waive their rights to reemployment and the perquisites of seniority
after their return from service."' However, the court did "not think
that an employee can waive his rights under the Act before entering
military service."' The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
employment rights provided by the VRRA were directed to the
survivors of conflict, intended by Congress to aid them to "return to
civilian life as easily as possible."" Because veterans should not be
burdened by the choices they make when facing reasonable
uncertainty over their future survival, the court held that contracts
waiving rights before return-that is, prospective contracts-were
void under the Act.' The House expressly approved of this common
law exception in the report, advising that "[a]n express waiver of
future statutory rights, such as one that an employer might wish to
require as a condition of employment, would be contrary to the
public policy embodied in the Committee bill and would be void." 3
This report sheds light on a congressional purpose behind the
statute that is not immediately apparent. Congress did not intend the
text of § 4302 to constitute the entire law on the enforceability of
USERRA waivers and modificationsY Rather, it expressly approved
of common law rules that supplemented its protections.95 Limitations
on veterans' USERRA rights en masse would interfere with
Congress's intent to preempt all statutes, plans, and collective
bargains. Some forms of individual bargaining-namely, those
agreements that would affect future rights-would be void. But,
importantly, accrued rights belong to veterans, and nothing in the
common law would prevent them from bargaining these benefits
away. The fact that Congress explicitly disapproved of only one
category of waivers without doing so generally lends further implicit
support that some waivers are permissible.
II.ROAD TO NOWHERE: EXISTING APPROACHES TO
INTERPRETING "MORE BENEFICIAL"

As noted in Part I.A, there is no dispute among courts and
federal agencies as to whether USERRA allows agreements that
89

Leonard, 972 F2d at 159.

90

Id.

91 Id at 160.
92
93
94
95

See id at 159.
HR Rep No 103-65 at 20 (cited in note 12).
Id at 19.
Id ("[T]he extensive body of [VRRAI case law.., remains in full force and effect.").
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augment USERRA rights either qualitatively or quantitatively. All
of the existing interpretations of "more beneficial" would rightly
allow a contract to, for example, guarantee returning veterans a
promotion upon their return. A private agreement could also extend
USERRA protections for an additional year. These agreements are
"more beneficial" because they augment rights and are uniformly
enforceable, as we would expect. It is less clear whether an
agreement can either add new rights or increase existing protections
while reducing them in other areas. In other words, does "more
beneficial" save net beneficial agreements? For example, could a
private agreement guarantee reemployment for two years in
exchange for fewer days of paid leave? Or, does "more beneficial"
save a severance package that provides a cash payout worth more
than the rights and protections provided by USERRA but eliminates
entirely those USERRA rights? If the answer to these questions is
yes, should we determine whether the payout is "worth more" than
USERRA by the subjective beliefs of the parties or objective
valuations?
This Part argues that the two major interpretations of "more
beneficial" available from existing sources are fatally flawed-they
either violate established canons of construction or contravene the
express wishes of Congress. Part II.A discusses an interpretation
advanced by DOL and Perez-"more beneficial" prohibits net
beneficial agreements and waivers. Part II.B explores the flaws of
the Wysocki holding-that "more beneficial" saves any agreement
supported by consideration as a matter of law.
The alternative approaches that have thus far been advocated or
implied, but not yet codified or adopted, are similarly unworkable
because they indirectly lead to the same consequences that lead us to
reject the major interpretations they deviate from. Part II.C discusses
the Wysocki concurrence's suggestion that "more beneficial" will not
save agreements that veterans do not believe are worth more than
their USERRA rights. Finally, Part II.D, inspired by a literal reading
of the legislative history, explains why "more beneficial" cannot
simply draw a different line between retrospective and prospective
agreements.
A. The DOL Approach: "More Beneficial" Allows No Waivers
One interpretation of "more beneficial" is that it disallows net
beneficial agreements. The textual justification for this reading is
that "reduces," as encompassed in § 4302(b), flatly prohibits any
reduction in USERRA rights whatsoever, and that "more
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beneficial," per § 4302(a), is merely a recognition that these rights
are not a ceiling above which employers are not allowed to offer new
and better rights to veterans. Of course, the natural consequence of
this reading is that waivers of USERRA rights are prohibited.
Section 4302(b) applies to "agreements," which severance packages
surely are, and "other matters," which is a catch-all that ensures it
applies to anything that could not be characterized exactly as an
agreement, like a pre-trial settlement agreement. There are three
major reasons why this interpretation is flawed. First, this reading
contravenes the express wishes of Congress. Second, it violates
established textual principles of construction. Third, it violates, albeit
counterintuitively, the interpretative rule to construe USERRA "in
favor of veterans."
The first argument is that it violates congressional intent. The
House indicated veterans "may waive [USERRA] rights, either
explicitly or impliedly, through conduct," while the Senate stated
that rights could be "waived through unambiguous and voluntary
action.""6 The House and Senate both recognized that veterans retain
some ownership of their USERRA rights.' Part III.A will explain
why legislative history is uniquely persuasive in interpreting "more
beneficial," but it suffices here to note that both chambers expressed
unequivocally that § 4302 allows veterans to waive their USERRA
rights.
Luckily, we do not need to rely solely on legislative history. The
canon of construction in pari materia states that provisions should be
interpreted symmetrically with similar statutes passed at different
times." The VRRA implicitly allowed waivers and releases of claims
despite a lack of express statutory authorization." This is
unsurprising since courts rarely require such express terms to infer
the ability to waive protections-especially if they are bargained
away. Despite provisions suggesting they are not allowed, waivers of
Age Discrimination Act,1" Title VII,1"' and Family Medical and Leave

96

Id at 20; S Rep No 103-158 at 41 (cited in note 70).

97 See notes 69-70 and accompanying text.

98 See Branch v Smith, 538 US 254, 281 (2003) ("IClourts do not interpret statutes in
isolation, but in the context of the corpus juris of which they are a part."), citing United States v
Freeman,44 US 556, 564-65 (1845).
99 See note 20. See also Leonard, 972 F2d at 159 (discussing ways veterans may waive rights
but citing no statute to support this proposition); Paisley v City of Minneapolis, 79 F3d 722, 725
(8th Cir 1996).
100Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602 (1967), codified at 29 USC § 621 et seq.
101 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at
42 USC § 2000e et seq.
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Act'" (FMLA) are all enforceable."m Moreover, even the
constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial in such actions
can be waived in exchange for consideration, though nothing in the
Constitution expressly authorizes such waivers."° Thus, a more
sensible presumption is that waivers are allowed unless there is clear
language showing that they are not.'" If Congress intended to reverse
this practice, it would have included provisions disallowing waiver,
not created a provision that could be read in a way to retain it.'10
Therefore, the best interpretation of the statute would reconcile the
sub silentio approval of the right to waiver of rights with the text of
the statute rather than allow an interpretation that would
incidentally destroy it.
Finally, interpreting USERRA to forbid waiver is not justifiable
even purely on the basis of public policy. The primary policy
argument for prohibiting waivers goes as follows: Duress should be
presumed in many situations where veterans waive their USERRA
rights. A no-waiver rule would prevent employers from pressuring
employees and would take the necessarily imprecise post hoc
analysis of the courts out of the equation.
In response to this argument, it might be said that a blanket nowaiver rule would discourage employers from offering severance
packages at all-even where such packages might be permissible
under USERRA. Severance packages, as in Wysocki, are vehicles to
extract claim settlements from veterans. But where these settlements
are presumptively unenforceable, employers will refuse to give up
something (cash) for nothing (an unenforceable piece of paper).
Employers set on firing their employees-either for questionable
reasons or because they believe they have an affirmative defensewould do so without the peremptory cash settlement. Thus, veterans
exposed to possible employment discrimination would experience
significant short-term suffering while facing the prospect of only
Pub L No 103-3, 107 Stat 6, codified in various sections of Title 29.
See Farisv Williams WPC-I, Inc, 332 F3d 316, 322 (5th Cir 2003).
104 See Robert Frankhouser, The Enforceability of Pre-disputeJury Waiver Agreements in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 8 Duquesne Bus L J 55, 55 (2004) ("[Pre-dispute jury
waiver agreements under current federal ... law are enforceable in employment discrimination
cases."); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of
ConstitutionalRights, 67 L & Contemp Problems 167, 197 (2004).
105 See Ware, 67 L & Contemp Problems at 188 (cited in note 104) (arguing that the
modern Supreme Court has adopted a "market-oriented" view receptive to allowing
contractual waivers of constitutional rights).
106 Consider Faris, 332 F3d at 321-22 (suggesting that a rulemaking body intending "a
departure from the policy employed in analogous areas" would have "manifested this intent
forthrightly").
102
103
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probable long-term relief. Even veterans with claims that
settle might face reduced or eliminated severance packages
their employers' uncertainty about the later enforceability
settlement. This is hardly a construction, then, "in favor
service member. '
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The Wysocki Approach: "More Beneficial" Allows Any
Waivers Supported by Consideration

The second potential interpretation of "more beneficial" is the
one adopted by the Wysocki majority. Under this interpretation,
"more beneficial" includes any agreement that is supported by
consideration. The justification for this interpretation is that the
operation of the "reduces" provision is limited by the "more
beneficial" provision. That is, if an agreement diminishes some
USERRA rights but nonetheless improves the veteran's position,
USERRA does not supersede it. This leaves the question of how to
determine whether the veteran's position has indeed been improved.
The Wysocki court thought that consideration was sufficient
evidence of this improvement. ' This might be explained by the
intuition that courts are not institutionally competent to value
agreements. Under this theory, we respect the judgment of our
veterans; thus, we should respect their judgments that waiving
USERRA rights was "more beneficial" unless we can find evidence
that the bargain was not at arm's length or otherwise unfair.'"
Consideration, used here, is a judicial shortcut. Some veterans,
like George Wysocki, will take severance agreements only because
they are the least bad option, not because those agreements are
worth more than USERRA claims. For example, facing certain
unemployment and only potential judicial relief years down the road,
a person with a $100,000 discrimination claim might take $6,000 to
keep food on the table for his family while he looks for another job.
Liquidity concerns could explain this result even if the eventual
probability of victory causes the expected value of the claim to
outweigh the settlement agreement.
The existence of counterexamples might not be sufficient to reject
the rule. But while this interpretation might be immediately appealing
for its administrative simplicity, it has no basis in the text of the statute
or the common law principles it invokes. Part II.B.1 will show that
107 Gordon v Wawa, Inc, 388 F3d 78, 81 (3d Cir 2004). See also HR Rep No 103-65 at 19
(cited in note 12).
108 See Part I.C.1.
109 See Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1108.
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textual principles strongly suggest that the Wysocki interpretation is
flawed. Part II.B.2 will show that the policies underlying the Wysocki
construction are misguided-its interpretation relies on an overly
formalistic conception of contract doctrine that is not in accord with
modem law.
1. Issues of statutory construction.
The rule against superfluity cautions against the Wysocki
holding. Under this canon, interpretations that give meaning to every
term of a provision are preferred to ones that strip terms of all
meaning. The majority in Wysocki held that contracts supported by
consideration are "more beneficial" to the veteran as a matter of
law. All contracts by definition are supported by consideration,
because, absent consideration, no contract is formed. Any contract
would therefore be "more beneficial" than USERRA under this
reasoning. But if this were the case, "more beneficial" could not limit
the word "contract." This renders the limitation superfluous.
Moreover, "reduces" would never apply to contracts, because
"more beneficial" would always shield them from its voiding effect.
This interpretation thus fails the rule against superfluity because it
renders terms superfluous and meaningless in both § 4302(a) and (b).
Admittedly, "contract" is only one type of matter that triggers the
"more beneficial" provision.'" Consideration is irrelevant to statutes
and policies. But interpretations that avoid superfluity entirely are
superior to those that allow it for some but not all members of a list."'
In addition, the Wysocki rule leads to results contrary to the
intent of Congress. The majority held that the "reduces" provision in
§ 4302(b) does not apply when the "more beneficial" provision in
§ 4302(a) is satisfied. USERRA's "more beneficial" requirement
applies not only to contracts, but also to any "Federal or State law
(including any local law or ordinance) ... or other matter." 2 A state
could therefore upset the federal veterans' rights scheme under the
Wysocki rule by enacting legislation that provided veterans wholly
different-yet net beneficial-guarantees from those granted by
federal law. For example, states could guarantee veterans a $200,000

110 See USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4302(b).
1l See Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 174 (2001), quoting Market Co v Hoffman,
101 US 112, 115 (1879) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v Nordic Village, Inc,
503 US 30, 35-36 (1992) (noting "the settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed
in such fashion that every word has some operative effect," rejecting an interpretation reducing
a provision to "trivial application").
112 USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4302(a).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:387

cash payment after their return and three months of health
insurance, but no reemployment rights. For many veterans, this
might be an improvement over USERRA's guarantees. Similarly,
collective bargaining agreements or employer policies could offer
arguably net beneficial schemes and thereby circumvent USERRA
coverage.
Congress did not enact a law that carefully struck a balance
between employer hardship, veterans' rights, and military
recruitment, only to allow employers and city governments to
unilaterally alter this balance without the consent of the veteran. "3
Congress instead drafted § 4302 to "reaffirm a general preemption as
to State and local laws and ordinances, as well as to employer
practices and agreements, which provide fewer rights or otherwise
limit rights.""
Indeed, "the federal government's interest in the area of
veterans' and reservists' rights is 'pervasive and exhibits a clear
intent to preempt conflicting state legislation.'.. 5 The opposite
position would leave "the States and the courts in a position to
review the reasonableness of the military's needs in the area of
personnel management and reservist training, and to balance such
needs against employers' interests in minimizing the burdens placed
upon them.., a task for which the States and the courts are wholly
unqualified.". 6
Section 4302 governs how USERRA relates to all other laws-it
doesn't apply just to contracts. Absent an additional limiting
principle distinguishing the way USERRA interacts with individual
bargains and collective decision making, the Wysocki rule therefore
produces workable results only in relation to some forms of private
law and fails to adhere to Congress's intent in relation to public law
and policies.
2. Contract doctrine.
The Wysocki interpretation also relies on an outmoded and
inaccurate conception of the meaning of consideration in relation to
what it tells us about the value of an exchange. If an agreement is
unsupported by consideration, no legally enforceable contract is

113
114
115

See notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
HR Rep No 103-65 at 20 (cited in note 12).
Cronin, 675 F Supp at 854, quoting Mazak v Florida Department of Administration,

1983 WL 1995, *4 (ND Fla).
116 Cronin, 675 F Supp at 854.
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formed."' Consideration exists either when a benefit gained or a

detriment suffered by another induces a party to come to an
agreement."' This hurdle is often quite low-even the mere
possibility of future gain can be adequate consideration."9 The

requirement serves three functions: it is cautionary, channeling, and
evidentiary." In light of these purposes, it is unsurprising that courts
generally refuse to inquire into the adequacy of consideration. After
all, "the parties to a contract are free to make their bargain, even if
the consideration exchanged is grossly unequal or of dubious
value.''. This also shows that consideration doctrine does not

purport to establish that, ex ante or ex post, an inducement was
actually beneficial to the parties. Because it does not measure at all,
consideration is an inappropriate measuring stick of the value of a
bargain.
In addition, the rule is not without exceptions. In many
situations, courts will examine the value of the exchange to each
party and use this evidence to invalidate contracts. Wysocki

inaccurately argued that courts do not look to the adequacy of
consideration. The most glaring example is the doctrine of
unconscionability, where the procedures or substance of a bargain
are so grossly unequal as to "shock the conscience" of the court.'"
According to Russell Korobkin, "When finding a term substantively

unconscionable, courts nearly always focus their attention entirely on
explaining why the term is extremely beneficial to sellers and/or
detrimental to buyers."'" Indeed, courts have invalidated terms in
waivers or other agreements because they in effect benefit only the
drafter,'2"

117

"unreasonably

benefit

one

party

over

another,' 2.

See Labriolav PollardGroup, Inc, 100 P3d 791, 793-96 (Wash 2004).

118 Marshall Durbin Food Corp v Baker, 909 S2d 1267,1277 (Miss App 2005).
119 See Apfel v Prudential-BacheSecurities, Inc, 616 NE2d 1095, 1097 (NY 1993).
120 Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 Colum L Rev 799, 799-801 (1941) (arguing
that consideration is "intended to remove the hazards of mistaken or perjured testimony which
would attend the enforcement of promises for which nothing is given in exchange").
121 Apfel, 616 NE2d at 1097, citing Spaulding v Benenati, 442 NE2d 1244, 1246 (NY 1982).
122 Armendariz v Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 99 Cal Rptr 2d 745, 752, 766-67
(Cal App 2000) (establishing the dual standards of procedural and substantive
unconscionability in California).
123 Russell
Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability,70 U Chi L Rev 1203, 1273 (2003).
124 See, for example, Olvera v El Pollo Loco, Inc, 93 Cal Rptr 3d 65, 74 (Cal App 2009)
("[Tlhe waiver is unfairly one-sided because it benefits only El Polio Loco, which is unlikely to
sue its employees in a class action lawsuit."); Szetela v Discover Bank, 118 Cal Rptr 2d 862, 868
(Cal App 2002).
125 See, for example, Cordova v World FinancialCorp, 208 P3d 901, 908-09 (NM 2009)
(modifying an arbitration provision that the court found to be egregiously one-sided).
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unreasonably diminish statutorily mandated protections,'" create
economic impediments to relief,'27 or simply bind parties to a price
disparity too great for the court to abide.""
Courts must also engage in similar inquiries to determine
whether the parties bargained based on a material mistake. A party
proves a mistake is material "by showing that the exchange is not
only less desirable to him but is also more advantageous to the other
party.' 2. It is often relevant to the court to compare the value of the
contract if facts were as both parties thought they were with the ex
post value when determining materiality-disagreements over these
values have precluded summary judgment.'30 In other situations,
courts have declined to enforce contracts where a bidder "names a
consideration that is out of all proportion to the value of the subject3'
of negotiation and the other party..,

takes advantage of it."' '

value and next-lowest bids to
Finally, courts will compare market
32
find evidence of a scrivener's error.

Another common law exception exists when fiduciaries engage
in hard bargaining. " ' Courts require a higher bar in these situations,
requiring "not merely the absence of unconscionability" but "fair
terms in the light of the circumstances at the time of its making."'"
At least one court has invalidated a contract where there was
evidence of a fiduciary relationship, uneven bargaining positions,
and an "inequality of the values exchanged.' ' .
126 See, for example, Padilla v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 68 P3d 901,
906-07 (NM 2003) (striking down a provision in an insurance contract that allowed de novo
appeal of damage awards).
127 See, for example, Ruhl v Lee's Summit Honda, 322 SW3d 136, 139-40 (Mo 2010).
Brewer v Missouri Title Loans, Inc, 2010 Mo LEXIS 202, *10-15 (refusing to enforce a class
action waiver where the complexity of the claims would make it economically impossible for
any individual claimant to hire a lawyer to represent her).
128 See, for example, American Home Improvement, Inc v Iver, 201 A2d 886, 889 (NH
1964) (holding unconscionable an agreement where "the defendants have received little or
nothing of value and under the transaction they entered into they were paying $1,609 for goods
and services valued at far less").
129 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152, comment c (1979).
130 See Buesing v United States, 42 Fed C1 679, 693-97 (1999) (declining summary
judgment on material mistake where the values were at issue).
131 See Water Works Board v Jones Environmental Construction, Inc, 533 S2d 225, 227
(Ala 1988), quoting Ex parte Perusini Construction Co, 7 S2d 576, 578 (Ala 1942).
132 See James T. Taylor and Son, Inc v Arlington Independent School District, 335 SW2d 371,
375-76 (Tex 1960) (noting that the party who alleged mistake placed a bid more than $10,000
below the next lowest competitor). But see Bartlett v Departmentof Transportation,388 A2d 930,
933-34 (Md App 1978).
133 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 173(a).
134 Id at § 173, comment b.
135 Lang v Derr, 569 SE2d 778, 783 & n 2 (W Va 2002) (noting that a fiduciary obligation
requires one "to secure the best price obtainable under the circumstances").
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These examples all show that to the extent Wysocki relied on a
hard judicial rule against determining the value of a contract, it was
wrongly decided. Any such judicial policy, at least in modern
contract doctrine, is riddled with exceptions at best and is illusory at
worst. Moreover, the exceptions square better than the rule with the
statute-it asks courts to determine whether an agreement is "more
beneficial," not whether the agreement is "supported by
consideration." Nothing in the text of §4302 suggests that
consideration is the appropriate starting point to determine whether
"more beneficial" should be assessed subjectively or objectively.
Because "supported by consideration" is not sufficient to prove that
a contract was net beneficial to any party either ex post or ex ante, it
is a poor yardstick for determining the scope of "more beneficial"
under § 4302(a).
C.

An Approach Derived from the Wysocki Concurrence: "More
Beneficial" Allows Any Waivers That the Veteran Believes
Makes Him Better Off

An alternative interpretation to Wysocki's consideration rule
could be extracted from the language of its concurrence. Under this
interpretation, "more beneficial" still limits "reduces," but the
veteran must provide only an affidavit stating that she did not
believe the contract was "more beneficial" to her in order to create
an issue of material fact.'36 In other words, subjective evidence alone
is sufficient to permit an inference that the contract is not "more
beneficial."
There is little textual support for imputing this subjective test to
USERRA. Section 4302(a) does not provide that USERRA saves
agreements that "the veteran believes or believed made him better
off" or "that the employer had reason to believe would make the
veteran better off." Rather, it saves only those agreements that
establish "a right or benefit that is more beneficial to... a right or
benefit provided" by USERRA. 7 The word "is" implies an objective
inquiry-the statute asks what "is" as opposed to what is perceived.
Moreover, as Part III.B will show, courts have interpreted other laws
with similar language to require objective valuations. Finally,
imputing subjective requirements cuts against the general preference
in contract law for more objectivity rather than less. This is
evidenced by the erosion of the subjective "meeting of the minds"
136
137

Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1110 (Martin concurring).
USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4302(a) (emphasis added).
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toward an objective theory of mutual assent and the prominence of

the reasonable person standard in contract interpretation.'"
Finally, this interpretation leads to the same policy result that
cautioned against adopting the DOL interpretation in Part II.A. In
order to argue that a severance package was not "more beneficial"
than the rights provided by USERRA, a veteran would need only to
swear under oath that she did not think the contract benefitted her
as much as a USERRA judgment would have. Her employer,
understanding that a release would be enforceable only upon the
whim of a terminated employee, will likely refuse to offer severance
payments to compensate for it. A subjective test does not, then,
meaningfully differ from a rule prohibiting waivers, because the
hurdle to invalidate them is trivially easy to clear.
D.

An Alternative Approach Derived from Legislative History:
"More Beneficial" Allows Only Retrospective Waivers
Bargained for Individually
The final available interpretation can be extracted from the

language of the House committee report interpreting § 4302. Under

this approach, we take Congress at face value when it says USERRA
was not intended to abrogate common law interpreting the VRRA.139
Courts interpreting the VRRA and its predecessor, the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, held that collective bargaining

agreements and state statutes modifying the VRRA's protections
were superseded."" They also interpreted the VRRA to invalidate
reductions in future rights as a matter of law."' This approach would
read § 4302 to also imply these prohibitions. USERRA would
therefore supersede any limitations imposed by statute, ordinance,
138 See Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the Realities of the Contracting Process-An
Essential Step to Achieve Justice in Contract Enforcement, 12 Del L Rev 95, 99-100 (2011)
(describing the general shift to objective evidentiary standards in determining assent in
contract formation); Amy Kristin Sanders and Patrick C. File, Giving Users a Plain Deal:
Contract-Related Media Liability for Unmasking Anonymous Commenters, 16 Comm L &
Pol 197, 204 (2011) ("Over time, [ ] courts have moved away from this subjective theory of
assent to an objective theory of assent that requires merely an outward expression of mutual
assent to form a contract."); Daniel P. O'Gorman, Expectation Damages, the Objective Theory
of Contracts, and the "Hairy Hand" Case: A Proposed Modification to the Effect of Two
Classical Contract Law Axioms in Cases Involving Contractual Misunderstandings, 99 Ky L
J327, 342-43 (2010) (discussing the move away from subjective theories of contract
interpretation in the mid-nineteenth century to today's objective standard).
139 See HR Rep No 103-65 at 19 (cited in note 12).
140 See Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 328 US at 284-91; Peel, 600 F2d
at 1073-74; Hogan v United Parcel Service, 648 F Supp 2d 1128, 1142 (WD Mo 2009)
(collecting cases).
141 See Leonard, 972 F2d at 159-60; Cronin, 675 F Supp at 854-55.
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or collective bargaining. The remaining matters that could conflict
with USERRA-such as individual bargains-would be enforceable
only if they affect rights already accrued (that is, retrospective).
Those affecting future rights (that is, prospective) -ones that the
veteran cannot presently exercise-are invalid.
One benefit of this interpretation is that it avoids the Wysocki
rule's loophole allowing state law and collective bargains to
circumvent USERRA protections. It also prevents employers from
pressuring employees to prospectively modify their USERRA
benefits. An agreement that, for instance, eliminates health coverage
if the employee goes on active duty and returns but expands her
reemployment guarantees for two years would reduce rights she
cannot yet exercise. It thus limits her future veteran's rights and must
be invalid under the rule. This does not create a redundancy problem
because these matters can still augment rights but can never reduce
them. "More beneficial" is thus limited but still has meaning.
Another benefit is that it has textual basis-§ 4302(b) imposes limits
on "prerequisites for relief," which would limit any employer plan
that conditioned employment on waiver or reducing USERRA
rights. This is a prospective waiver because it affects reemployment
rights that have not yet accrued.
The issue here is that this distinction is not made in § 4302(a)the "more beneficial" provision. If all Congress meant by "more
beneficial" was that retrospective contracts are okay and prospective
ones are not, why didn't it simply make this explicit? Moreover, it
doesn't appear, once § 4302(b) does its work, that "more beneficial"
any longer imposes limits on retrospective contracts. In other words,
we know that prospective contracts that reduce in some ways and
benefit in others are invalid. But we do not know whether
retrospective contracts that reduce in some ways and benefit in others
are invalid. This interpretation standing alone would allow the result
in Wysocki, which did deal with rights that already accrued to a
veteran, without wrestling with the question whether that agreement
really did make him better off or not. It is, in this way, even less
limiting than the Wysocki consideration rule. This reading cannot tell
us whether net beneficial agreements are enforceable-it therefore
does not meaningfully explain the relationship between "more
beneficial" and "reduces."
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III. PERFECT WORLD: A BETTER INTERPRETATION OF
"MORE BENEFICIAL"

As noted in Part II, every available interpretation of
USERRA's "more beneficial" requirement would allow agreements
augmenting veteran benefits. That is not the issue here. The question
that must be resolved is when, if ever, "more beneficial" saves net
beneficial agreements. Part II demonstrated the flaws inherent in
current interpretations of "more beneficial." How can they be
reconciled?
Strangely enough, none of the current interpretations of "more
beneficial" take the provision at face value: namely, that the
agreement must actually be "more beneficial" than USERRA rights.
In other words, "more beneficial" demands an objective test. Under
this literal reading, "more beneficial" would save net beneficial
matters that make veterans objectively better off than they would be
counterfactually exercising their USERRA rights. Courts would
assess the value of the agreement, then the value of the USERRA
guarantees. If the former outweighs the latter, the release is
enforceable, and the employer wins on summary judgment.
Otherwise, the case may proceed to trial.
This interpretation resolves many of the problems discussed in
Part II. Unlike DOL's interpretation, it allows waivers in some
instances. But it would not allow waivers in all instances, thus
avoiding the redundancy arguments cutting against Wysocki.
Furthermore, by avoiding a strained subjective test, both parties will
gain predictability and unworthy claims will not proceed to trial. This
literal interpretation, however, cannot be the end of the analysis. An
objective test alone would not solve the problems in Part II.B:
without more, an objective test would still allow states and collective
bargaining to preempt federal law if they arguably make veterans
better off on net.
The next step, then, is to find a limiting principle elsewhere in
the law to accord our interpretation of "more beneficial" with
congressional intent. Courts should, relying on in pari materia and
the implicit support for these cases in USERRA's legislative history,
continue to recognize the common law protections in Leonard, Peel,
Cronin, and Fishgold as valid law and an essential step in analyzing
"more beneficial." Retaining these common law restrictions on en
masse and prospective waivers would prevent such matters from
reducing any USERRA rights, even if they make the veteran better
off. This part of the solution neatly solves the preemption issue. All
state actions, employer plans, and collective bargaining agreements
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reducing any USERRA right would be void under Peel, Cronin, and
Fishgold. Remaining matters applying to veterans who have not yet
returned from service necessarily affect their future rights and would
thus be void under Leonard."'
For these reasons, "more beneficial" should only save
retrospective, individual agreements that make the veteran
objectively better off than she would be exercising her rights under
USERRA. This rule allows waivers in some circumstances but only
after guaranteeing an objective floor for the level of care a veteran
will receive after she returns-whether this care is in status, salary
and benefits, or a one-time cash payout. If she makes a conscious
choice to agree with her employer to leave her job, she can do so as
long as the agreement is actually net beneficial to her.
This solution is subject to a few criticisms. First, legislative
history is persuasive but not binding. There is no mention of a
"prospective" or "retrospective" distinction, or a flat ban on
collective waivers, in the statute. Part III.A argues that, even if
legislative history is unpersuasive, purely textual reasons allow us to
conclude that Congress intended to retain these common law
protections from the case law interpreting USERRA's predecessor.
The second line of criticism is that, while Wysocki might have
been overly formalistic, requiring courts to open up bargains still
seems like an imprudent result that should be avoided if other
interpretations are available. Part III.B concludes that this
interpretation is nevertheless consistent with the way similar
provisions have been applied by drawing analogies to other
antidiscrimination laws and the Bankruptcy Code.
A. "More Beneficial" Does Not Save Prospective or
Collective Waivers
Congress assumed that the Leonard rule against prospective
waiver would remain in force under USERRA to supplement § 4302.
To return to the canon of construction in parimateria, it is preferable
to read statutes to be consistent with the common law interpreting
previous statutes.' Nothing in USERRA explicitly abrogates
Leonard. To the contrary, the "reduces" provision, § 4302(b), also
prohibits "prerequisites" to exercising rights.'" Prerequisites are a
form of future reduction of rights. Suppose an employee agreement

See Part LID.
See note 97 and accompanying text.
144 USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4302(b).
142
143
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required a reservist to agree to attend a two-week, unpaid training
session before she could return to work from her future tour of duty.
This agreement limits future rights by circumscribing the conditions
under which she can exercise them-she can get her year of
reemployment after she returns if only she agrees before she returns
that she will be reemployed subject to conditions imposed by the
employer. The inclusion of this word could be read to implicitly
distinguish reductions that occur before the right is enjoyed and
those that occur after it has accrued.
The second textual justification is that including these common
law supplements to § 4302 resolves a recursive loop between
§ 4302(a) and (b). As pointed out in Part II, DOL and the Wysocki
court disagree over which provision is prior-"more beneficial" or
"reduces." Recall it isn't clear from the statute whether the
applicability of "reduces" is conditional upon the inapplicability of
"more beneficial." In other words, the text alone cannot answer
whether the "reduces" provision is triggered any time there is a
rights reduction, or if "reduces" is triggered only when "more
beneficial" is not triggered. If "reduces" is prior to "more
beneficial," no net beneficial agreements are allowed, but also no
waivers are allowed. This is clearly an absurd result given the
VRRA, legislative history, and the presumption that waiver is
allowed unless explicitly prohibited by a statute.'4' But if "more
beneficial" is prior, without more, it would allow at least net
beneficial state laws and employer plans to supersede federal law.
Thus, both approaches are equally problematic. Yet, other than the
weak argument that § 4302(a) merely comes before (b), the statute
provides no structural guidance as to which problematic result to
prefer.
Leonard and the cases banning collective waivers under the
VRRA resolve this conflict by eliminating the problems for one of
the choices. If collective or prospective reductions of rights are
prohibited as a matter of law, no state law or collective bargaining
agreement could possibly be enforceable-they are not made with
the consent of the veteran and would affect rights of persons who are
not yet in the military.'" Prioritizing "more beneficial," then, would
not be a concern. These cases therefore provide a neat solution to an
intractable harmonization issue between "more beneficial" and
"reduces."

145
146

See Part II.A.
See Part I.D.
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If Congress intended to retain the protections advocated here,
why were they not written into the statute? Unlike the consideration
inference drawn in Wysocki, these rules were expressly approved by
the House report-evidence that the relation-to-other-laws provision
is to be read with them in mind.' Moreover, this distinction is not
foreign to waivers. For instance, a far more blunt regulation
promulgated under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
provides "[e]mployees cannot waive, nor may employers induce
employees to waive, their prospective rights under FMLA.'4' Yet,
the Fifth Circuit, analyzing the intent of the promulgating body, held
that "[a] plain reading of the regulation is that it prohibits
prospective waiver of rights, not the post-dispute settlement of
claims.'.. Prospective waivers of Title VII claims are also disallowed,
though there is no text from which to draw this distinction.' °
Securities law also takes this approach-courts interpreting waivers
and releases in securities law have drawn a distinction between
anticipatory and prospective waivers, though the text of the rule
could be used to justify eliminating all releases.'' Finally, though no
courts have yet held that it applies, courts considering Leonard as
applied to the VRRA have suggested in dicta that the Leonard rule
would apply to USERRA actions. 2
B.

"More Beneficial" Means Objectively Better Off

If "more beneficial" cannot include collective or prospective
waivers of future rights, which individual, retrospective waivers will
it nonetheless save? Wysocki stands for the proposition that
contracts releasing USERRA claims and supported by consideration
are "more beneficial" to the veteran. Part II.B.2 established that this
approach depends on an understanding of contract doctrine that
oversimplifies its nuances, glossing over well-established principles
that would have allowed the court to apply the statute as written.

See notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
29 CFR § 825.220(d).
149 Faris v Williams WPC-I, Inc, 332 F3d 316, 321 (5th Cir 2003) (emphasis added)
(affirming also that this is consistent with the language in the rest of the regulation).
150 See Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36, 51 (1974) ("[T]here can be no
prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII."); Richardson v Sugg, 448 F3d 1046,
1056 (8th Cir 2006).
151 See Korn v FranchardCorp, 388 F Supp 1326, 1329 (SDNY 1975) ("To rule otherwise
would foreclose the parties from settling matured claims and force every claimant to pursue
the litigation to its costly conclusion.").
152 See Lapine v Town of Wellesley, 304 F3d 90, 105-08 (1st Cir 2002) (extending Leonard
to voluntary members of the armed services).
147
148
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This Part shows that the reluctance to "interfere" with contractsdespite the "more beneficial" provision-is inconsistent with the
approach the Supreme Court and other appellate courts have taken
in relation to similar statutory commands in the employment
discrimination context and the law generally. Moreover, courts have
proven institutionally competent to take on the task of valuing and
comparing the consideration exchanged in contracts in other
contexts. This Part concludes that the best reading of "more
beneficial" gives it its plain meaning-it requires courts to evaluate
the worth of the USERRA rights at issue and the agreement
objectively to determine whether the agreement's value is greater
than the value of the USERRA guarantees.
1. Valuation of contracts and modification of the common law
in antidiscrimination statutes.
Exceptions to the judicial reticence toward analyzing bargains
do not exist only at common law. The argument that more is
required than sufficient consideration gains even more weight where
statutes either impliedly abrogate the common law or create
additional requirements to enforceability. The general rule is that
statutes do not abrogate the common law without a clear signal from
Congress.'53 But the Supreme Court has held that other employment
and antidiscrimination statutes modify or outright destroy common
law doctrine by implication.
One example is waiver in the age discrimination context. In
Oubre v Entergy Operations," the Court invalidated a waiver of

claims under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act' (OWBPA)
that was supported by consideration and therefore sufficient at
common law but did not meet the precise statutory requirements
meant to protect older workers."' Because the statute laid out these
requirements in great detail, the Court held that the OWBPA "sets
up its own regime for assessing the effect of [Age Discrimination in
Employment Act] waivers, separate and apart from contract law."".7
Lower courts have thus far roundly refused to apply Oubre to
antidiscrimination claims where relation-to-other-law provisions do
153 See United States v Texas, 507 US 529, 534 (1993), quoting Mobil Oil Corp v
Higginbotham, 436 US 618, 625 (1978).
154 522 US 422 (1998) (holding that employees cannot waive ADEA claims unless their
waiver satisfies the OWBPA's requirements for doing so).
155 Pub L No 101-433, 104 Stat 978 (1990), codified in various sections of Title 29.
156 Oubre, 522 US at 427-28.
157 Id at 427.
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not require additional safeguards to ensure arms-length bargaining."
However, the case illustrates an example when "federal law...
abrogated this common law doctrine [of release] through Congress'
policy decision requiring heightened protection......
Oubre also provided justification for a fascinating case relevant
here. In United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v
Johnson & Higgins," a district court denied summary judgment to an

employer that came forward with evidence of release.'6 In that case,
the court expressly examined the adequacy of consideration, finding
an issue of material fact because $1,000 was offered in return for
releasing rights the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) claimed were worth at least $3 million.'62 It
concluded that the amount was not sufficient as a matter of law
because "[c]ommon law doctrines of consideration, though they may
inform our reading, are not dispositive where there has not been
compliance with the statute.""'6 The Johnson & Higgins holding was
limited to its facts in the dicta of a later case in the same district."
However, even this decision limiting Johnson & Higgins still
approved of its approach: where there exists a relation-to-other-law
provision, a contract can be valid only if it first passes threshold
federal statutory requirements.'' Only then is it proper for the court
to look to pre-statute contract doctrine to determine its validity in
state law."
Express provisions as in Oubre are not always necessary. The
Supreme Court has also found that federal statutes implicitly
abrogated common law doctrine in other employment
antidiscrimination cases. For example, the Supreme Court held that
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act' 7 (ADEA) abrogated
federal estoppel rules by implication." The Court has also held that
158 See, for example, Duval v Callaway Golf Ball Operations, 501 F Supp 2d 254, 263
(D Mass 2007).
159 Bennett v Coors Brewing Co, 189 F3d 1221, 1233 (10th Cir 1999).
160 5 F Supp 2d 181 (SDNY 1998).
161 Id at 186.
162 Id at 185-86.
163 Id at 186.
164 Consider Sheridan v McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc, 129 F Supp 2d 633, 639 (SDNY
2001) (labeling Johnson & Higgins an "extraordinary case" and suggesting that evidence of
coercion explained the result).
165 See Sheridan, 129 F Supp 2d at 639 (holding that the court may look to contract
principles only "after examining a waiver's validity under the statutory framework established
by the OWBPA").
166 See id.
167 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602 (1967), codified at 29 USC § 621 et seq.
168 See Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Association v Solimino, 501 US 104, 110-11 (1991).
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Title VII-with only implicit support from the statute-abrogates
the common law presumption toward claim preclusion when cases
are adjudicated by federal agencies.' 9 Finally, state statutes often
modify contract doctrine without an express statement to this effect.
A famous example is UCC § 2-207, which abrogates the mirror
image rule.'7" And Delaware, for instance, established rules that
impliedly eliminated fiduciary duty principles in favor of freedom of
contract.'7'
There is nothing radical about the suggestion that § 4302
implicitly abrogated common law consideration doctrine for
determining the validity of waivers. In the antidiscrimination context
especially, courts have proven willing to set aside state contract law
when it conflicts with Congress's statutory goals and commands.
Rather than assume it was bound to bend its construction of
USERRA to accommodate contract law, the Wysocki court should
have considered bending contract law to accommodate USERRA's
statutory language.
2. Comparing values for fraudulent conveyances.
One final concern is that courts are not institutionally competent
to value contracts at all. Consideration doctrine, the argument goes,
might indeed be an imperfect proxy for measuring beneficiality. But
if it is true that the doctrine is the only tool courts have in their
toolbox, we might nevertheless conclude that it is the least bad
alternative absent precedent that can guide courts in how to perform
these valuations. Luckily, courts applying "more beneficial" can
draw on an extensive body of law where courts regularly value
contracts pursuant to statutory commands-bankruptcy.
An instructive example is the fraudulent transfer provision in
the Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 USC § 548(a)(1)(B), a trustee may
avoid a transfer made within one year of filing if the debtor was
insolvent and "voluntarily or involuntarily.., received less than a
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer.' 7. This
provision requires courts to calculate the value of the transaction
from the debtor to a third party from the creditor's point of view,
See University of Tennessee v Elliott, 478 US 788, 794-96 (1986).
See Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 BU L Rev 1397,
1440 n 178 (2009) ("[T]he U.C.C. abolishes the strict form of the mirror image rule.").
171 See Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnershipsand Limited Liability Companies, 32 Del J Corp L 1, 10 (2007) (suggesting the
legislature intended to "establish legislative policy in derogation of the common law's fiduciary
duty principles").
172 11 USC § 548(a)(1)(B).
169
170
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voiding the transfers that net the debtor assets "substantially

comparable to the worth of the transferred property. '73 Essentially,
"[t]he value of consideration received must be compared to the value
given by the debtor.""
In applying this provision, courts regularly investigate both the
stated values of exchange and their true worth. For instance, one

court held that a transfer of over $2.3 million in assets was not a
reasonably equivalent value to assets with a stated worth of
$2 million, where most of that $2 million was unlikely ever to
materialize.' Another court invalidated a transfer where a plan that
increased pension benefits cost "twice the
norm" and "exceeded the
employees. ""' 76

amount necessary to retain

Admittedly, "reasonably equivalent value" does not always

demand courts to compare assets exchanged in bargains. The
Supreme Court, in BFP v Resolution Trust Corp,'" held that in a
forced sale, the actual price of a transfer has "reasonably equivalent
value" so long as "all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law
have been complied with. '78 This result, at first blush, appears to
support the intuition behind the Wysocki holding. The Court, rather

than applying the text of the statute to require courts to determine
reasonably equivalent values, used state law as a proxy for
reasonableness. The "reasonably equivalent value" is the value of

the exchange, just as contracts are "more beneficial" when they are
actually agreed to.

However, this glosses over an important difference in the
reasoning supporting BFP. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the

majority in BFP, admitted that the language of the statute was
straightforward. It "directs an inquiry into the relationship of the
value received by the debtor to the worth of the property
173

United States v Loftis, 607 F3d 173, 177 (5th Cir 2010), quoting BFP v Resolution Trust

Corp, 511 US 531,548 (1994).
174 In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp, 444 F3d 203, 213 (3d Cir 2006), quoting Mellon Bank v
Metro Communications, Inc, 945 F2d 635, 648 (3d Cir 1991).
175 See Loftis, 607 F3d at 177. Loftis also provides an instructive example of a court
valuing assets more complex than the ones in play in a USERRA dispute. There, the court
evaluated the monetary worth of assets as diverse as a partial interest in a home, a minority
stake in a limited liability company, restitution payments to the government from fraudulent
conduct, and, most relevantly, the value of a person's future income in perpetuity. See id
(making these comparative determinations despite the difficulty of "determin[ing] with any
precision" their present values, finding that the expected worth of one party's future income
asset was limited by the government investigation into his criminal activities, including a
potential prison term and fines).
176 See Fruehauf,444 F3d at 215.
177 511 US 531 (1994).
178 ld at 545.
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transferred.' 79 The Court mirrored state law requirements because it
is otherwise impossible to determine the true value of a forced sale
from the market price." The alternative is to first make a
determination of what the market price would have been, were a
market possible, and then to judge what values would count as
reasonably equivalent to that imaginary value."' But this cannot
account for "the lesser included inquiry into the impact of forced
sale" given its "effect of completely redefining the market.""
The phrase "more beneficial" in USERRA is similarly
straightforward, but applying it lacks the valuation problems that
worried the Court in BFP. Unlike the hypothetical market value of
property in a foreclosure, the value of employment benefits are easy
to calculate. Courts have already proven institutionally competent to
determine the worth of USERRA guarantees in particular-they
make these determinations regularly when calculating damages. '
Similarly, they already have guidelines for evaluating the worth of
both back and front pay in other anti-employment discrimination
statutes." Moreover, because USERRA rights are only valid for a
year after reemployment begins, the chance of error is quite low."'2
That leaves only the comparison, which-after determining valuesis the easy part."

179 Id.

Id at 544-45.
BFP,511 Us at 544-45.
182 Id at 548.
183 United States v Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation,
2010 WL 3326704, *3-7 (MD Ala) (calculating the worth of USERRA reemployment rights
based on several hypothetical scenarios in order to calculate damages).
184 See Madden v Chattanooga City Wide Service Department, 549 F3d 666, 679 (6th Cir
2008). In Madden, the Sixth Circuit outlined a six-factor test that district courts must use in their
discretion to set the value of front pay in a Title VII case. Id. The factors include
180

181

(1) the employee's future in the position from which she was terminated; (2) her work
and life expectancy; (3) her obligation to mitigate her damages; (4) the availability of
comparable employment opportunities and the time reasonably required to find
substitute employment; (5) the discount tables to determine the present value of future
damages; and (6) other factors that are pertinent in prospective damage awards.
Id (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Suggs v ServiceMaster Education Food
Management, 72 F3d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir 1996). A court capable of performing these tasks
pursuant to one employment discrimination statute is certainly capable of performing simpler,
backward-looking analysis under another.
185 See USERRA § 2(a), 38 USC § 4316(c) ("A person who is reemployed by an
employer under this chapter shall not be discharged from such employment, except for cause
within one year after the date of such reemployment, if the person's period of service before
the reemployment was more than 180 days.").
186 Consider BFP, 511 US at 547 (arguing that the plain meaning of reasonably equivalent
value still leaves ambiguity as to the worth of a foreclosed property).
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Indeed, some lower courts after BFP have refused to apply its
rule-even in foreclosure cases-where these valuation problems are
not present. One appellate bankruptcy panel held that $450 was not

"reasonably equivalent value" for a house appraised at between
$10,000 and $50,000 where the price was set by the amount of tax
debt on the debtor. " The Supreme Court itself recognized that its
interpretation was to be limited only to forced sales, noting that
"reasonably

equivalent

value"

maintained

an

"independent

meaning... outside the foreclosure context.""
These examples are meant to suggest that, contrary to the

traditional view, modern courts are called upon in federal statutes to
determine the adequacy of consideration in a bargain-a task they

handle competently. They also show that courts interpreting statutes
with analogous language to USERRA's "more beneficial" provision
have employed the objective analysis proposed by this Comment.

The Sixth Circuit feared that comparing the value of Wysocki's
severance to his employment rights would constitute judicial

interference. But this "interference"

is in fact an established

tradition in employment discrimination and other areas like
bankruptcy. The more plausible case for interference here is
interference with Congress-especiallywhen commanded to perform

this analysis by statute."' Instead, the plain requirement to compare
the benefits of the contract with the hypothetical benefits provided
by USERRA is coherent with modern trends in the law, alleviating

the need to resort to the judicial short-cut taken in Wysocki.
Finally, this rule is consistent with the spirit and purpose of the

statute-to protect veterans." The Wysocki opinion was correct to
point out that the drafters intended veterans to retain ownership of
187 Sherman v Rose, 223 BR 555, 559 (BAP 10th Cir 1998) (discerning that not just any
sale of the property should be determined to be "reasonably equivalent value"). Compare In re
Grandote Country Club Company, 252 F3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir 2001) (distinguishing Sherman
because the state procedures at issue did require a competitive bidding process), with In re
Talbot, 254 BR 63, 70 (Bankr D Conn 2000) (rejecting this distinction on grounds that states
have the right to establish this value).
188 BFP, 511 US at 545 (explaining why its interpretation did not render the provision
"superfluous"). See also id at 548-49 ("[F]oreclosure has the effect of completely redefining
the market ...[because] normal free-market rules of exchange are replaced by the far more
restrictive rules governing forced sales.").
189 See Lopez v Dillard's, Inc, 382 F Supp 2d 1245, 1248-49 (D Kan 2005) (comparing
USERRA with the ADEA, FMLA, FLSA, Civil Rights Act, ADA, and Title VII, and finding
that "none of these acts contain any statement that remotely approaches the sweep" of § 4302).
190 For a more complete discussion of USERRA's history and purpose, see Part I.A.
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their rights.'9 ' This is certainly an important goal. However, this is but
one value of many that Congress attempted to balance in passing
USERRA. The statute was principally designed to minimize or
eliminate disadvantages and disruption to civilian employment for
veterans. Surely, unencumbered rights "ownership" is not so highly
prioritized that it trumps the express purpose in the preamble of the
bill. Indeed, courts have read paternalistic principles into
USERRA's predecessor. The Leonard court noted:
War is hell, and a call to arms is harrowing. Faced with this
unavoidable disruption in their lives, inductees may make
choices that are sensible when death looms, but cease to make
sense when they discover that they have survived. The
reemployment rights provided by the Act are necessarily directed
to the survivors, and Congress intended that they be able to return
to civilian life as easily as possible."
Quite the opposite of respecting bargains and choices made by
veterans, the overarching goal of protection and reintegration has
justified courts in rejecting bargains otherwise made absent duress or
misrepresentation. Given this, it is not so surprising that Congress
required agreements to be "more beneficial" than USERRA rights.
Far from allowing uninhibited freedom of contract, this underlying
purpose suggests Congress wanted to ensure that veterans did not
too easily squander the rights directed to them. Thus when they give
away their USERRA rights after a tour of duty, servicemembers
should receive at least the level of benefits Congress contemplated
for them in return.
CONCLUSION: STOP MAKING SENSE

Section 4302 is an extraordinary provision, but that does not
mean we must ascribe to its language meanings that are out of the
ordinary. "More beneficial" contracts are not those that are merely
supported by consideration or believed to improve the veteran's
position, but those that actually make her better off. This solution
reflects the plain meaning of the phrase and explains why adopting
alternative constructions constitutes judicial intervention, not simply
executing its clear command.
Of course, judges might need to flesh out the "more beneficial"
inquiry, depending on the arguments raised by the opposing parties.

191 Wysocki, 607 F3d at 1108.
192 Leonard,972 F2d at 159-60 (emphasis added).
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Questions such as whether to measure beneficiality ex post or ex
ante, 93 or incorporate the likelihood of success on the merits into the
expected value of the alternatives are potentially relevant
questions.'" Courts could also consider shifting the burden of
production on employers, reasoning that §4302 establishes an
additional element to the affirmative defense of release. This would
require the employer to prove the contract was "more beneficial" to
avoid summary judgment against its defense. Finally, parties might
resolve the comparative valuation issues by itemizing the benefits
being traded and stipulating to their value in the agreement itself.
Courts could presume that these stipulations were accurate and
made voluntarily unless a party presents sufficient evidence to call
them into question.
Many other questions, such as how to value the harm stemming
from the disruption of continuous employment on future career
prospects, would likely properly be reserved for the finder of fact.
This Comment does not seek to hypothesize about how the answers
to these legal questions should come out absent concrete facts.1 '
Courts are already quite capable of determining the value of
USERRA benefits when calculating damages, and there is no reason
why those tools could not be applied to § 4302.'"
What this Comment hopes to establish is both that retrospective
waivers are enforceable under USERRA and that more than a
showing of consideration is necessary if the veteran can provide
evidence that the agreement was objectively not "more beneficial"
than the benefits she would have received under the statute. This
solution reconciles precedent currently ignored by courts with a
natural reading of the statute, and avoids a result that eviscerates its
effective protection or disallows veterans from exercising limited
ownership over their rights.

193 Consider Korobkin, 70 U Chi L Rev at 1274 (cited in note 123) (arguing that courts
analyzing unconscionability should focus "on the utility of the entire contract to buyers ex ante
compared to a counterfactual contract").
194 Consider Johnson & Higgins, 5 F Supp 2d at 185 (considering "the damages to which
the employees would be entitled if they prevailed on the merits").
195 Fraudulent conveyance law may yet again provide useful answers to this inquiry. For a
succinct discussion of how bankruptcy courts evaluate a transfer's worth, see In re Gonzalez,
342 BR 165, 172-73 (Bankr SDNY 2006).
196 United States v Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation,
2010 WL 3326704, *3-7 (MD Ala) (calculating the worth of USERRA reemployment rights
based on several hypothetical scenarios in order to calculate damages).

